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Abstract 
 
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are debt obligations whose cash flows are backed by 
the principal and interest payments of pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on 
residential property (Riddiough, 2001). Lenders establish underwriting guidelines, 
evaluate prospective homeowners’ credit, and make loans. Having done so, lenders 
generally hold only a fraction of the loans they make in their own portfolios. Most are 
sold to the secondary market, where they are pooled and become the underlying assets for 
residential mortgage-backed securities. Individuals with strong credit qualify for 
traditional mortgages, whereas those with weak credit histories that include payment 
delinquencies, and possibly more severe problems such as charge-offs, judgments, and 
bankruptcies qualify for subprime loans (Hayre, 2001). Securitization is the financial 
technology that integrates the market for residential mortgages with the capital markets. 
Investment banks take pools of home loans, carve up the cash flows from those 
receivables, and convert the cash flows into bonds that are secured by the mortgages. The 
bonds are variously known as residential mortgage-backed securities (R-MBS) or asset-
backed securities (ABS). 
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Introduction 
 
Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (R-MBS) is a debt instrument, which, pursuant 
to its terms, entitles the holder to receive as its primary source of repayment the cash 
flows derived from an underlying pool of residential mortgages, which serves as 
collateral for the security. The mortgage loans are purchased from a seller, usually the 
originator or mortgagee, and are pooled with loans having similar characteristics. The 
buyer is a special purpose vehicle (SPV) formed to issue mortgage-backed securities. 
When such securities are issued, the mortgage loans underlying the security are assigned 
to a trustee. The Trustee takes possession of the mortgage loans and any additional credit 
enhancements supporting the related securities on behalf of the investors. The creation of 
a mortgage occurs in the primary mortgage market, while the purchase and resale of 
mortgages takes place in the so-called secondary mortgage market. The secondary 
mortgage market serves the purpose of replenishing the supply of funds available to 
create additional mortgages. Securing a credit rating for a RMBS significantly enhances 
its liquidity as well as its potential sales price. 
 
The UK mortgage market is dominated by variable-rate mortgages. Although the 
mortgage rate is adjusted to reflect current interest rates, variable rate mortgages carry 
prepayment risk; lenders take time to adjust their mortgage rates to changes in market 
rates so re-financing opportunities exist in the market. Kau, Keenan, Muller and 
Epperson (1993) point out that in order to correctly value adjustable rate mortgages and 
adjustable rate mortgage-backed securities both, default and prepayment risks must be 
taken into account. The risk of prepayment faced by the investor in mortgage-backed 
securities is the risk of the securities being called at any time due to the investors 
prepaying their mortgages (Fabozzi, 1992). The issuing prospectus of sterling mortgage-
backed securities clearly state this risk by pointing out that the notes are partially 
redeemable at any coupon payment date by the amount of prepayment in the pool since 
the last payment date. The disadvantage for the holder of the note is that if prepayment 
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occurs when interest rates are falling, the holder will have to reinvest the proceeds at a 
lower rate, so there is reinvestment risk (Cummings, 1997). Also, the life of the notes is 
uncertain.  
 
Conventional wisdom holds that market volatility or market risk has declined. For risk 
that remains, markets have reduced the price for taking on that risk. Boudoukh, 
Richardson, Stanton, and Whitelaw (1995) show that even after doing as good a job as 
possible hedging mortgage-backed securities using Treasury securities, a sizeable fraction 
of the original volatility remains. This suggests that there may be one or more omitted 
variables.1 A leading candidate for such an omitted variable is the level of house prices. 
Not only do housing prices affect the level of default activity, but a low house price also 
affects the borrower’s ability to qualify for a new loan, and hence may also affect 
refinancing behaviour.2 
Figure 1, below illustrates the conventional view as it related to mortgage markets. Since 
2003, swaption volatility has decreased substantially, along with the Mortgage Bankers 
Association Refinancing cost index and residential mortgage-backed security (R-MBS) 
yield spreads over LIBOR. Such circumstances have reduced mortgage costs to 
homebuyers and set the stage for the “new financial markets,” that are thought to more 
efficiently value and price risk. Of course, risk does not go away. It can be diversified in 
portfolios, but diversification works to only offset risk. Hence, if risk is priced lower, that 
pricing must reflect either an increased appetite for fully-disclosed risk or the lack of 
disclosure of risk for the same risk appetite. 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
1An alternative potential explanation is that everything is driven only by interest rates, but that mortgages 
cannot be hedged using Treasury securities alone due to the presence of unspanned stochastic volatility 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). However Boudoukh (1995) show that interest rate volatility does 
not help to explain much of the residual volatility of MBS prices. 
2A number of prior empirical studies have documented the importance of home equity on the propensity to 
re-finance Becketti and Morris (1990), Monsen (1992), Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1993). Stein (1995), 
Archer, Ling, and McGill (1996), Mayer and Genesove (1997), Mattey and Wallace (1998), and Mattey 
and Wallace (2001) also emphasize the importance of housing prices as a determinant of regional level 
household mobility. 
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Figure 1: Residential R-MBS Yield Spreads, MBS REFI Index, and Swaption Volatility 
 
 
 
Source: Nomura, Structured Finance Trends – Yield Spreads, Credit Support, and Collateral Performance 
The above figure illustrates many of the key changes to residential mortgage origination 
and servicing standards that have occurred over the past two decades. Those changes 
have ultimately resulted in a wider range of risk among the types of financial instruments 
call mortgages. 
 
Non-agency (“private label”) securities, which are not guaranteed by the government or 
the government-sponsored enterprises, now account for the majority of residential 
mortgage-backed securities issued. When changes to origination and servicing occur 
unpredictably over time or across issuers, thereby affecting the cash flows of some 
unknown number of mortgages, R-MBS become more difficult to value. Hence, changes 
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in origination and servicing practices, along with the existing complexity of R-MBS, 
results in greater opacity in the residential mortgage-backed securities market.  
 
Risks of Investing in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities 
 
The investor in mortgage-backed securities faces the risks related to investing in the 
underlying mortgages. These risks include the options embedded in any mortgage 
contract (Arnold, 2002). As a result, a mortgage-backed security is a complex financial 
instrument. A mortgage borrower has two options: the option to default, i.e. to “put” the 
property back to the lender at an exercise price equal to the value of the mortgage; and 
the option to prepay, i.e. to “call” the mortgage from the lender at an exercise price equal 
to the outstanding principal. These options can be exercised at any time. However, in 
some cases, prepayment during the first year carries a penalty of between 1 to 3 months 
of interest rate. However borrowers prepay for a myriad of other non-financial reasons: 
sale of the property, divorce, or a new job in another location (Glaeser, 1997).  
 
Figure 2: Risk Grading in the Mortgage Industry 
 
 
 
Source: Fitch IBCA, Rating U.S. Residential Subprime Mortgage Securities, Jul. 18, 2001. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the increased gradation of risk among mortgage borrowers. The 
additional grades of risk arise from the willingness to underwrite mortgages for more 
risky borrowers, making riskier loans to more typical borrowers. Both practices increase 
the total amount of risk to be sold in the marketplace. However, increased grading of risk 
induced increased complexity, and therefore increased opacity. Risk that is more difficult 
to see, by virtue of complexity, is risk just the same. There are plenty of reasons to 
believe that the amount of risk in the marketplace has increased while opacity has made it 
seem otherwise. The traditional approach to pricing mortgage and mortgage-backed 
securities has been to construct a theoretical model to value the options embedded in the 
mortgage: this requires modelling the dynamic behaviour of interest rates and house 
prices, incorporating prepayment and default options in the price of the mortgage-backed 
securities (Corcoran, 1989). Building societies, the major mortgage lenders, and the 
Council of Mortgage Lenders (a body that groups all the authorised mortgage lenders) 
rarely disclose information. Data on default only appears semi-annually, building 
societies publish quarterly repayment data, but the high level of aggregation of the figures 
reduces their usefulness. Empirical validation of any model of prepayment and default is 
therefore limited. 
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Legal Issues 
 
Needless to say, that parties adversely affected by the losses created by the decline in the 
value of his residential mortgage-backed securities is likely to bring legal actions seeking 
to recover some of these losses. An example of the potential for extensive litigation 
arising out of losses is the situation of Luminent Mortgage Capital, Inc. Luminent 
Mortgage Capital is currently suing Merrill Lynch (and various Merrill Lynch 
subsidiaries and affiliates) for alleged misrepresentations with respect to the sale of junior 
MBS tranches as well as HSBC Holdings for allegedly improperly placing too low a 
value on nine subprime mortgages that a subsidiary of Luminent Mortgage Capital had 
put up as collateral. Luminent Mortgage Capital, in turn, has five Rule 10b-5 class action 
suits filed against it for false statements as well as a counter-suit by HSBC Holdings for 
breach of contract. 
 
False or Misleading Statement 
 
R-MBS documentation must reflect the underlying analysis of the cash flows and ensure 
that the parties are required to take the requisite actions under local law to convey the 
collateral, perfect a security interest in it, collect and distribute the cash flows in 
accordance with the financial model and exercise the bondholder’s rights in the event of a 
default. R-MBS documentation establishes the contractual relationship between the 
issuer, the investor and all other parties; sets out specific terms of the issue; states any 
covenants that restrict the parties and provides information about the issuer, including its 
financial status, to enable a fair price to be set for the issue and to enable investors to 
make an informed decision about its purchase; provides guidelines for the distribution of 
the cash flows; perfects a security interest in the collateral; and provides a mechanism for 
liquidation of collateral in the event of a default. One possible claim is a false or 
misleading statement in the registration statement, giving rise to Section 11 liability. The 
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issuer of the security, the SPV, underwriters, and auditors will all be subject to potential 
Section 11 liability (with the latter two groups having due-diligence defences). With 
respect to other communications made during the registered offering process, misleading 
statements can give rise to Section 12(a) (2) liability. And, of course, such misstatements 
would be subject to Rule 10b-5 liability, but such a cause of action would have to survive 
the difficult hurdle of demonstrating responsibility. There are four misleading disclosures 
in the registration statement or offering communications for registered residential 
mortgage-backed securities, all relating in some way to the underwriting quality of the 
underlying mortgages themselves that could potentially be pursued such as:  
 
• outright fraud with respect to the documentation surrounding the mortgage 
origination rendering statements made in the offering process false; 
  
•  lack of adequate disclosure of underwriting standards for the underlying 
mortgages; 
 
• the extent to which exceptions were made to whatever the underwriting standards 
were; and 
 
• the pricing of the various R-MBS tranches.  
 
The presence of these disclosure issues in the registration statement, including fraud in 
the mortgage origination, will prove problematic for an SPV as there is no Section 11 
due-diligence defence for issuers. With respect to all four disclosure issues, the role of the 
due-diligence firms looms as a potentially critical litigation issue in the actions being 
brought against various actors in the structured finance arena. The information provided 
to these parties by the due-diligence firms on the quality of the underlying mortgages is 
very likely to be the subject of extensive litigation for a number of reasons. First, the 
provision (and even the availability) of due-diligence information to the investment banks 
(Global Integrated Bank) acting as the underwriter for the R-MBS will arguably affect 
the availability of a Section 11 due-diligence defence with respect to material 
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misstatements in the MBS registration statement. The Plaintiff in this regard is likely to 
point to the In re Worldcom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 346 F.Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) decision, where the court concluded that defendants had not established a due 
diligence defence due to “red flags” that should have put the Section 11 defendants on 
notice that Worldcom’s accounting was inaccurate.3 Second, the provision of information 
on the underwriting quality of the mortgages will also arguably speak to the available of a 
“reasonable care” defence (the defendants did not know and in the exercise of reasonable 
care could not have know) with respect to any Section 12(a)(2) suits brought by plaintiff. 
Third, such information might be used in actions such as breach of contract and negligent 
misrepresentation claim. 
 
Finally, there are a number of possible state causes of action, including breach of 
contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation that might be brought by plaintiff. In 
short, it is quite likely that the plaintiff, in attempting to establish liability for various 
disclosure deficiencies, will attempt to rely upon information that is uncovered by the on 
going investigations in terms of what was actually known by the due-diligence firms 
concerning mortgage underwriting quality and the extent to which that information was 
shared with the investment banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
3
 The key issue here will be what constitutes a “red flag” necessitating further investigation before a due-
diligence defence will be viable. 
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Due Diligence 
 
The real importance of the role of the due-diligence firm is likely to lie not in the context 
of litigation brought by the R-MBS purchaser, but rather in the large Rule 10b-5 class 
actions that have been filed against the investment bank. Plaintiff will undoubtedly argue 
that the information that was given to the investment bank in their capacity as sponsor of 
SPVs issuing R-MBS, one of the main hurdles in bringing a Rule 10b-5 action; that is, 
Global Integrated Bank, it will be claimed, knew that the R-MBS securities and the CDO 
interests that they held on their own book were worth significantly less than what they 
were reporting to the markets. Moreover, the same line of attack will be employed to 
argue that the “contingent losses” faced by the investment bank as a result of potentially 
having to bring SPV assets onto their own book. In the context of this litigation filed 
against Global Integrated Bank, the claim will be that the investment bank and mortgage 
originators breached their duty of care and loyalty by purchasing imprudent investments.  
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The distinction between ex ante expectations and ex post losses 
 
The basic distinction between ex ante expectations and ex post losses, a distinction 
fundamental to finance theory will go to the core of many of the alleged disclosure 
deficiencies with respect to the investment banks’ disclosures to their security holders. A 
failure to provide detailed disclosures concerning the implications of an event that was 
unexpected by most investment bankers, as evidenced by the huge losses many of these 
investment banks themselves suffered, will likely prove an important stumbling block for 
plaintiffs. 
 
The decision in Olkey v. Hyperion 1999 Term Trust, 98 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1996) is 
instructive on this point. In this decision the Court considered the claim by investors in a 
closed-end fund that held R-MBS that there was liability based on Section 11 and 12(a) 
(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. The investors 
claimed, among other things, that there was a misrepresentation in the prospectuses 
marketing the fund, because it failed to disclose the risky nature of the underlying R-
MBS portfolio and, furthermore, that there was a failure to disclose the size of the 
potential losses if there was an adverse move in interest rates. Needless to say, the 
purchasers in this case suffered substantial losses.4 In rejecting these arguments, it was 
noted that the plaintiffs “claim that another set of investment choices should have been 
made, based upon a different conception of what interest rates would do. . . . This is only 
to say in hindsight that the managers of those [alternative] funds turned out to be more 
skillful in their predictions.” In other words, the presence of disclosure failures (and the 
materiality thereof) must be assessed in light of what was knowable at the time of the 
disclosure, even if ex post substantial losses have occurred.5 A number of pieces of 
evidence will speak to what was foreseeable at different points in time, some of which 
have already been raised, such as the changing nature of the R-MBS market in recent 
years.  
                                                  
4
 Re K-Tel Int’l, Inc. Securities Litigation, 300 F.3d 881, 893 (8th Cir. 2002). 
5
 Ford Motor Company Securities Litigation, 381 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2004) 
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One way to consider this issue is to look at Global Integrated Bank reported value at risk 
(VaR) estimates, a widely used measure by investment banks to measure the risk inherent 
in their financial positions, immediately before the losses. Did these estimates predict, 
even in a rough way, the size of the subsequent write downs or even which firms were 
most exposed in a situation where the credit markets substantially tightened? In short, Mr 
Joyner will have to provide a basis to establish that there was misleading material 
disclosures made beyond merely noting that there was extensive economic loses. 
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Undisclosed information already known by the market does not give rise to 
recoverable damages 
 
Another important issue that will be germane to many of the securities claims being filed 
is not only what did the issuer (or other parties being sued) reasonable know ex ante, but 
what did the market know and when did it know. With respect to macroeconomic issues, 
such as the current or future state of the economy, interest rates or the national housing 
market, it is quite implausible to believe that the SPVs or the investment bank (Global 
Investment Bank) sponsoring and underwriting the R-MBS had any special knowledge 
concerning these matters that was not already know by the market (Hendershott, 1989). 
In a situation where the market is as informed as a defendant, whether it be an SPV or 
some other participant in the structured finance market, as to a particular issue, then the 
“truth on the market” doctrine in securities law will provide an opportunity for 
defendants to argue that any misrepresentation concerning that issue was not material 
and, hence, not actionable.6 
 
If this information was not known (or even knowable) by Global Integrated Bank then the 
issue of “loss causation” will become important. “Loss causation” is the necessary 
connection between a material misstatement and economic losses and must be established 
by him in a Rule 10b-5 action and is a defence in Section 11 and Section 12(a) (2) 
actions. The Supreme Court, in its seminal decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo, 
544 U.S. 336, 352-53 (2005), explained that losses due to “changed economic 
circumstances, changed investor expectations, new industry-specific . . . conditions, or 
other events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that lower 
price” will not be recoverable as a result of the loss causation requirement. The Global 
Integrated Bank here will likely argue that a changed “economic circumstance” and “new 
industry-specific” factor was the unexpected nationwide decline in the fortunes of the 
housing market. Losses occurring as a result of this are therefore non-recoverable as they 
were not caused by any disclosure deficiency, even assuming that there was one.7 The 
                                                  
6
 Ganino v. Citizen Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2000). 
7
 Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) 
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question will be the extent to which the information allegedly held by the investment 
bank would have changed market expectations if the market had learned the information. 
As always, the burden of establishing that such a change in market expectations would 
have occurred, and hence the disclosed information is arguably “material” is placed on 
Mr Late-Joyner.  
 
With respect to claims that there was inadequate disclosure of potential exposure to off 
balance sheet losses, the “truth on the market” doctrine will once again be potentially 
relevant. Even assuming an obligation to disclose such information under the applicable 
accounting rules, the question will remain whether such non-disclosure was material or, 
rather, was the market already aware of potential off-balance sheet exposures. Details of 
the off-balance sheet arrangements, information relating to off-balance sheet exposures 
could have reached market participants, such as hedge funds, that could trade on that 
information in the course of buying and selling the investment banks’ stock (thereby 
ensuring that the investment banks’ stock price reflected this information). The plaintiff 
need to so allege to establish reliance on a class-wide basis, but it does raise a successful 
“truth on the market” argument as to the non-materiality of the off-balance sheet 
exposures. 
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Disclosure deficiencies 
 
There is another distinction that is likely to prove important in litigations that is worth 
bearing in mind. This distinction is between disclosure issues with respect to the quality 
of the underlying mortgages (or Mortgage-backed securities in the case of Collaterized 
debt Obligations) and disclosure issues with respect to which parties were exposed to the 
risk of these assets falling in value. Investment banks, SPVs, mortgage originators or, for 
that matter, Global Investment Bank simply have no legal duty to disclose where the risk 
in the system lies. Indeed, it would be literally impossible for such disclosures to take 
place, as no single entity has such information. In practical terms, an institution transfers 
its assets to a legally isolated and bankruptcy remote “special purpose entity” (SPV). The 
assets, structured properly, are allowed to be removed from the balance sheet of the 
selling company it then records a gain in accordance with accounting standards 
(Skarabot, 2002). To be effective for the selling company the sale must comply with 
domestic and international accounting standards. Auditors will not sign off on moving of 
assets “off of the balance sheet” for accounting purposes without a legal opinion 
recognizing the securitization as a “true sale”. That is to say, simply, that the assets have 
moved beyond the control of the seller (Higgins, 2004). This serves several purposes, 
especially for financial institutions. Among them, it generally allows the firm to have less 
deposits to fund loan activity, in most periods this market financing will be less costly to 
larger institutions than other funding, and it generally allows them to hold less regulatory 
capital than they would have to if they held all of the credit risk. 
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Accounting Issues 
 
The typical Rule 10b-5 class action complaint against Global Integrated Bank alleges that 
the bank did not adequately disclose and reserve for its potential liability for losses 
experienced by off balance sheet entities. Obviously allegations of improper disclosure of 
losses that might occur due to off-balance sheet exposures will turn on the applicable 
accounting rules. In the context of off-balance sheet entities exposed that resulted in 
losses for investment banks (as well as mortgage originators), much of the discussion to 
date has focused on whether there was a “true sale,” as defined in Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Extinguishments of 
Liabilities (FASB 140), of mortgages by the investment bank (or the mortgage originator) 
to the SPV issuing the MBS. This is of considerable interest given that if there was a 
“true sale” then the asset need not remain on the balance sheet of the transferor upon sale. 
The importance of FASB 46(R) in the context of litigation lies primarily in the fact that 
many CDOs with subprime exposure are subject to FASB 46(R) given their structure.  
 
The FASB 46(R) analysis reflects the basic distinctions between ex ante expectations 
versus ex post losses and information held by GIB versus information held by the market 
as a whole that were emphasized earlier. FASB 49 46(R) requires calculation of which 
entities, if any, are subject to a majority of the off-balance sheet’s expected losses and 
returns, not realized losses and returns. Furthermore, FASB 46(R) refers to FASB 
Concept Statement Number 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in 
Accounting Measurements when describing how the probabilities of future events should 
be calculated.  
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This Concept Statement explains that, “The use of an entity’s own assumptions about 
future cash flows is compatible with an estimate of fair value, as long as there are no 
contrary data indicating that Global Integrated Bank would use different assumption. If 
such data exists, the entity must not adjust its assumptions to incorporate that market 
information.” In other words, expected losses and returns must be based, to the extent 
possible, on the market’s perception of the probability of future events, rather than the 
individual entity’s determination. One arguably possible indication of the market’s 
assessment of the probability of future losses is whether or not the CDO tranche enjoys 
an investment-grade rating (Oldfield, 2000). 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Litigation 
 
There has already been a number of lawsuits filed arising out of the mortgage crisis under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 1974 (ERISA). ERISA suits have been 
filed, among others, against Citigroup, MBIA, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and State 
Street. The ERISA litigation represents an important component of the litigation as it 
provides plaintiffs with two important advantages. First, plaintiffs need not establish 
responsibility as is the case under Rule 10b-5. Rather, liability is based on a breach by a 
defendant of a fiduciary duty. Second, at least pre-Dura Pharmaceuticals, the measure of 
damages resulting from a breach of a fiduciary obligation has tended to be quite 
generous, at least as reflected by the terms on which suits are settled.  
 
The fiduciary breach 
 
Virtually all complaints filed against the investment banks and mortgage originators to 
date claim that the company executives and administrators who oversaw the retirement 
plans knew, or should have known, that the company was facing substantial losses and, 
hence, should have disclosed this information to plan participants. Several interesting 
issues arise with respect to the plaintiff claim, besides the obvious issue once again of 
whether the mortgage crisis was foreseeable. One issue looming in the background is the 
extent to which court will be willing to transform ERISA into a third general securities 
disclosure statute complementing (or substituting) for the detailed disclosure regimes 
established in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934. An 
announcement by ERISA fiduciary that a firm was facing substantial losses due to 
subprime exposure would have resulted in a drop in the value of the stock held by Mr 
Joyner. If such a disclosure would not have resulted in a stock market reaction, it is 
difficult to see how there could be a duty to disclose the information in the first place as it 
would not be material. But this logic has an interesting resulting from such an ERISA 
violation. The failure to disclose the adverse information by the ERISA fiduciary did not 
cause the losses suffered by plaintiffs with respect to the securities he held at the time the 
breach of the duty to disclose, but rather merely delayed it.  
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Employee Retirement Income Security Litigation Damages 
 
Plaintiffs bringing ERISA actions can be argued, relying on the Second Circuit’s 1985 
opinion in Bierwirth v. Donovan, 754 F.2d 1049, that damages should be calculated 
based on the best performing fund available in the plan. In times of market declines, such 
a fund might well be a money market fund. This approach can effectively render the 
ERISA fiduciary an insurer against general declines in the stock market. The ERISA 
statute itself merely states that the ERISA fiduciary shall “make good to such plan any 
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach . . .” 29 U.S.C. 1109 (2000). The 
Supreme Court’s decision in 2005 in Dura Pharmaceuticals explained that losses due to 
market and industry-wide developments will not result in damages if such damages are 
not caused by actionable misconduct (in Dura Pharmaceuticals the misconduct was 
actionable under Rule 10b-5) by the defendant. Applying the same reasoning to ERISA 
damages, parties could argue that market and industry wide declines are not the “result [ 
]” of a breach of fiduciary duty. Such an argument, given the important implications it 
has for the extent of the damages available under ERISA, will be hotly contested. The 
issues involved in resolving such a debate are quite involved, including consideration of 
the proper interpretation of the Bierwirth opinion, the continued validity of Bierwirth in 
light of Dura Pharmaceuticals, and the notion of “causation” in the common law of trust 
that has been used by courts in the course of interpreting the ERISA statute. 
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The rating agencies 
 
The challenge facing plaintiffs here are two-fold: 
 
• specifying the precise meaning of “excessively high”; and 
 
• why “excessively high” ratings, so defined, “inflated” the stock price of the rating 
agencies to the detriment of their security holders.  
 
A rating arguably has no meaning without reference to the criteria that generated it, 
which was publicly known and could be independently assessed by third parties. The 
source of the fraud is therefore difficult to locate. The rating agency gets paid for 
providing a rating and not for the success of the offering (Hendershott, 1989). RMBS, as 
part of a static capital structure, funding a static investment strategy composed 
exclusively of fixed income assets, and trading thinly over the-counter with few market 
price signals, require dynamic ratings in order to adequately reflect risk. The main point 
is therefore that, in the case of R-MBS, bond ratings are being used for something they 
were not initially intended and often sold on the basis of a fundamental misunderstanding 
of diversification. In summary, R-MBS are complex securities that are difficult to value. 
R-MBS are built on the backs of pools of mortgages, which themselves are complex and 
difficult to value. Furthermore, fundamental changes to underwriting and servicing 
standards are not easily identifiable in the inherent complexity of mortgages and R-MBS, 
posing risk to funding for socially and economically important consumer mortgage 
originations. 
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Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
The risk premium on mortgage-backed securities is influenced by contractual features 
and market variables that increase the risks associated with investing in these types of 
securities. The longer the life of the securities the higher the premium demanded by the 
investors (Walsh, 1995). One of the benefits of securitization finance is the relationship 
between the risk profile of the issuer and the investor: since the assets backing the issue 
are isolated, the risk and return of the securities depends on the risk and return of the 
assets, and not on the risk and return of the issuer (Kolari, 1998). UK mortgage-backed 
securities market: the price of the securities largely reflects factors influencing the 
underlying assets. The residential mortgage industry crisis is one of the foremost 
economic issues facing the UK today. This crisis is not solely an economic phenomenon 
but a legal one as well. It is widely believed that the substantial decrease in the value of 
asset-backed securities faced by investment banks and other purchasers that held 
previously rated investment grade CDOs with subprime exposure ( Lucas, 2006), as well 
as junior or mezzanine tranches of R-MBS will generate substantial, perhaps 
unprecedented, levels of litigation. Alternatively, this litigation will serve to highlight 
where the market may have underestimated certain risks, failed to anticipate particular 
circumstances, or identified those links in the mortgage chain that may have been weak. 
This is a distinction that plaintiffs will undoubtedly have to struggle with. 
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